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2A-10/19/9 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNION OP ROOFERS, WATERPROOPERS, 
AND ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 22, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4045 
TOWN OP MARION, 
Employer. 
RICHARD D. FURLONG, ESQ., for Petitioner 
BRENT D. COOLEY, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Marion (Town) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) finding that the United 
Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers, Local No. 22 
(Union) should be certified without an election pursuant to 
§201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
The Town argues that our Rules, which permit a union to be 
certified without an election if it has otherwise established its 
I 
majority status, are undemocratic and inconsistent with the 
recommendations of the Taylor Commission, which allegedly 
expressed a preference for a determination of a union's majority 
status by an election. 
As the Town recognizes, we previously have considered 
similar challenges to our Rules regarding certification withput 
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an election, most recently and most comprehensively in Bethlehem 
Public Library.-7 In that case, we held that our certification 
without election Rules are consistent with the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act), which requires an election only "if 
necessary11 Jto.^ s_c_ejM:ain_the_emp^  
(Act §207.2). The Union was entitled to certification without 
election under our Rules as written and consistently applied. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. We, therefore, 
issue the following certification of representative and order to 
negotiate: 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Union of Roofers, 
Waterproofers, and Allied Workers, Local No. 22 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
1723 PERB 53009 (1990). 
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purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All mechanical equipment operators employed 
in the Highway Department, including the 
foreman. 
Excluded: The highway superintendent and all others, 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Union of Roofers, 
Waterproofers, and Allied Workers, Local No. 22. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fkiw, %. UN^L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/usdiz- 2-
Walter 
f ^7^ 
Eisenberg, Member 
E r i c J . / S c h m e r t z , Member ~8~ 
2B-1Q/19/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WATERLOO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. DR-038 
Upon a Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
WILLIAM R. SELL, for Waterloo Education Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Waterloo 
Education Association (Association) on a declaratory ruling by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) issued on a petition filed by the Waterloo Central 
School District (District). The Director ruled that two 
proposals still in dispute in the parties' negotiations are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The proposals in issue, next set forth, are from the General 
Information article of the parties' expired 1989-91 contract. 
G. Except as required by this Agreement, both 
parties shall maintain at least the present 
standards affecting the terms and conditions 
of employment of the members of the 
Association. 
H. This Agreement should not be interpreted or 
applied in any manner which will deprive Unit 
Members of professional and/or employment 
benefits and/or advantages heretofore 
enj oyed. 
Board - DR-038 
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The Director held that both proposals are nonmandatory 
because they are broad enough to include nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Director 
erred in his statements regarding the origination of the demands, 
i^This application of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), and his construction of the contract language. The 
District, in its response, urges affirmance of the Director's 
decision. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
The Director opened his decision by observing that the 
demands were proffered by the Association. The Association 
disputes the accuracy of that statement, but it is not material 
to the disposition of the petition. No matter how raised, the 
demands are plainly in dispute. Indeed, they are the only 
remaining open issues in an otherwise settled agreement. The 
context in which the demands are presented is sufficient for 
purposes of a declaratory ruling procedure.-/ 
The Association's two remaining exceptions are directed to 
the merits of the Director's ruling. We affirm that ruling for 
the reasons stated in the Director's decision. In affirming, we 
reject the Association's argument that because "terms and 
conditions of employment" are, by definition, mandatorily 
See Seneca Falls Teachers Ass'n., 23 PERB f3032 (1990). 
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negotiable, it necessarily follows that any and all actions 
affecting those terms and conditions of employment must also be 
mandatorily negotiable. The conclusion is simply not a necessary 
corollary of the stated proposition. As to paragraph H, although 
many of the "professional and/or employment benefits and/or 
advantages" may be mandatory subjects of bargaining, the language 
would also restrain the District from making changes in those 
"benefits or advantages" which are not mandatorily negotiable 
such as, for example, class size or duty assignments. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the Association's exceptions are dismissed. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
2C-10/29/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PAID FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF PEEKSKILL, 
NEW YORK, INC., LOCAL 2343, IAFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11089 
CITY OI^PEEKSKILL, ~ 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF PEEKSKILL, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
PEEKSKILL POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11097 
CITY OF PEEKSKILL, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS F. DeSOYE, ESQ., for Charging Party in u-11089 
BRIAN M. LUCYK, ESQ., for charging Party in U-11095 & U-11096 
WILSON & FRANZBLAU (KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU Of counsel) and 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Charging Party in U-11097 
RAINS & P06REBIN, P.C. (DAVID M. WIRTZ and SHARON N. BERLIN 
of counsel), for Respondent 
CASE NOS. U-11095 
& U-11096 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases, which we have consolidated for decision, are 
before us on either exceptions or cross-exceptions from all 
parties, except the charging party in U-11097, to decisions by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). 
Case No. U-11089 is a charge filed by the Paid Firemen's 
Association of Peekskill, New York, Inc., Local 2343, IAFF 
(Firemen's Association) against the City of Peekskill (City). 
Case Nos. U-11095 and U-11096 are charges filed by 
Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) against 
the City. Case No. U-11095 is filed on behalf of IBT's blue-
collar unit; Case No. U-11096 concerns IBT's white-collar unit. 
Case No. U-11097 is a charge filed by the Peekskill Police 
Association (Police Association) against the City. 
The charges are substantially similar. Each alleges that 
the City violated §209-a.l(d)-/ of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, on April 24, 1989, it changed its 
practice to require current employees in all units who retire on 
or after January 1, 1990 to pay a portion of their health 
insurance premiums upon their retirement. Each of the cases was 
submitted to the ALT for decision on the pleadings and an 
exchange of correspondence. 
1'The Firemen's Association also alleged in U-11089 that the City 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. The ALT dismissed those 
allegations for lack of proof and no exceptions have been taken 
to his decision in that respect. 
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The ALJ dismissed the Firemen's Association's charge in 
U-11089 and IBT's charges in U-11095 and U-11096 for the same 
reason. When the City first required the health insurance 
contribution from retirees, both the Firemen's Association and 
IBT were without collective bargaining agreements, their 
contracts having expired December 31, 1988. The ALJ concluded 
that the existence of a collective bargaining agreement was 
necessary for there to be any right to bargain retiree health 
insurance contributions. 
The Police Association, however, had a contract in effect 
when the premium contribution was first required of its unit 
employees who retired on and after January 1, 1990. That 
contract for the first time required a health insurance premium 
contribution from active police officers under different formulas 
for 1989, 1990 and 1991. According to the ALJ, the existence of 
that contract entitled the Police Association to bargain 
regarding the health insurance benefits of those police officers 
who retired during the term of the 1989-91 contract for the term 
of that contract. The ALJ also found in that case that the 
City's practice was to pay 100% of the premium for health 
insurance for retirees despite the premium contribution required 
of active employees under the Police Association's 1989-91 
contract. The ALJ treated the retirees and the active employees 
as two separate classes and held that the contribution required 
of the active employees by agreement did not entitle the City to 
impose that same contribution on the retirees. 
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The Firemen's Association and IBT argue in their exceptions 
that the stated term of a collective bargaining agreement neither 
defines nor limits bargaining rights or obligations regarding 
retirees. The ALJ's dismissal of the Firemen's Association's and 
IBT's charges is assertedly contrary to prior decisions of this 
Board and the policies of the Act. 
The City's cross-exceptions in U-11089, U-11095 and U-11096 
are related to the exceptions it filed in U-11097. The City 
argues in its exceptions and cross-exceptions that none of the 
unions proved a unilateral change in practice regarding health 
insurance premium contributions by retirees. The City argues in 
that respect that the record is at least equally susceptible to 
an interpretation that retirees were always subject to the same 
level of premium contribution as the active employees. 
According to the City, a contribution in the same amount as that 
required of active employees in the retiree's former unit is not 
a change in practice but the continuation of a practice. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we dismiss the 
charges filed by IBT as moot. We also dismiss the charges filed 
by the Firemen's Association and the Police Association, albeit 
on other grounds. The Police and Firemen's Associations' charges 
are dismissed because we are persuaded that they have not 
satisfied their burden to prove a change in practice. 
All of the charges were filed with respect to an April 24, 
1989 City resolution. That resolution required a health 
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insurance premium contribution from all City retirees, regardless 
of their unit placement, according to the contribution required 
of current employees in the Police Association's unit under the 
then existing 1989-91 contract with the Police Association. In 
September 1990, however, the City promulgated a new resolution 
that requires a health insurance premium contribution from a 
retiree only to the same extent and degree as that required of 
the active employees in the retiree's former bargaining unit. As 
a result of contract negotiations with the City, active employees 
in IBT's units do not contribute toward their health insurance 
and, accordingly, neither do the retirees from those units. 
The April 24, 1989 resolution has been effectively rescinded 
as to IBT. We have no evidence that any health insurance 
contributions have been taken from the retirees from IBT's units. 
As the issues raised by IBT's charges are academic, we do not 
consider that the policies of the Act would be served by our 
consideration of IBT's charges. The same factors which led us 
very recently to approve the parties' discontinuation of an 
appeal in New York City Transit Authority,^ lead us to dismiss 
IBT's exceptions on this ground. In doing so, we decline to 
follow so much of any prior decisions which hold or suggest that 
traditional mootness concepts may not be applied in any of our 
improper practice proceedings.-; Our decision in this respect 
?/26 PERB f3037 (1993) . 
l/See, e.g.. Citv of New York, 10 PERB f3077 (1977), aff 'a 9 PERB 
54507 (1976). 
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is limited to the facts and circumstances of this case. We 
recognize that the application of a mootness concept is 
controlled by the particular facts of the case and applied only 
to the extent consistent with the policies of the Act. 
By contrast, neither the Police Association's charge nor the 
Firemen's Association's charge is moot. The Police Association 
and the employees it represents are no differently situated under 
the September 1990 resolution than they were under the April 1989 
resolution. In effect, the September resolution merely carried 
forward the April resolution unchanged as to the Police 
Association. The circumstances involving the Firemen's 
Association are not precisely the same as either those affecting 
the Police Association or IBT. Unlike IBT, as a result of its 
contract negotiations with the City, active members of the unit 
represented by the Firemen's Association are making a health 
insurance premium contribution. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
September resolution, retirees from the Firemen's Association 
unit are compelled to make the same health insurance contribution 
as made by the active members of that unit. Unlike the Police 
Association, the September resolution effected a different change 
in contribution than that effected by the April resolution as to 
the Firemen's Association. We do not consider this difference to 
dictate dismissal of the Firemen's Association's charge as moot. 
The Firemen's Association's charge, like the Police 
Association's, is grounded upon the requirement of a health 
insurance premium contribution from retirees in any amount. The 
Firemen's Association alleges that the prevailing practice is 
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free health insurance for retirees. A contribution in any 
amount, therefore, allegedly violates that practice. As the 
April resolution has been effectively rescinded as to the 
Firemen's Association, however, we can only assess the propriety 
of the City's action under the second resolution. 
Turning to the merits, we dismiss the Police and Firemen's 
Associations' charges. Unlike the ALJ, we do not find that the 
contribution admittedly required of the retirees from the Police 
and Firemen's Associations' units by itself establishes a 
unilateral change in practice. The ALJ's decision on this point 
hinges entirely on his having treated the retirees and the active 
employees as members of two different classes for purposes of the 
receipt of health insurance benefits. There is nothing in the 
record, however, to suggest that the parties ever treated 
retirees differently from active employees with respect to this 
benefit. In short, the fact that both active and retired 
employees had 100% of the health insurance premium paid by the 
City is at least equally susceptible to a conclusion that a 
health insurance premium contribution required of retirees in an 
amount equal to that required of active employees in the 
retirees' former unit left the parties' practice with respect to 
retiree health insurance unchanged. The evidence being in 
equipoise, neither the Police Association nor the Firemen's 
Association has carried its burden of proof to establish a change 
in practice. 
In reaching his decision on this issue, the ALJ relied upon 
our decision in State of New York (Division of Military and Naval 
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charges on these bases, we do not express any opinion regarding 
IBT's or the Firemen's Association's exceptions or the parties' 
arguments regarding the negotiability of retiree health insurance 
benefits. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, C hairpersc 
Walter^E. Eisenberg, Member' 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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Affairs)-7 (hereafter DMNA). DMNA, however, does not compel or 
warrant the decision reached by the ALT. In DMNA, we held that a 
union had established a change in practice on proof that the 
computation of certain leave benefits had been changed to the 
detriment of unit employees. In defense to this admitted change 
in practice, the employer argued that its practice was qualified 
or conditioned, a defense as to which the employer had the burden 
of proof and failed to carry. Unlike DMNA, the question here is 
not whether the City had a defense to a unilateral change, but 
whether there has been a demonstrated change in practice. The 
record here does not establish anything more than that retirees 
and active employees have never been treated differently. That 
historical identity of treatment has been continued. From the 
simple fact of the retirees' payment of a health insurance 
premium contribution, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that 
there has been a change in established practice. Something more 
evidencing a practice of distinguishing the health care benefits 
for retirees and current employees is required and it is not 
present on this limited record. 
For the reasons and on the bases set forth above, all of the 
charges must be dismissed.-7 The City's exceptions in U-11097 
are granted to the extent consistent with our decision and the 
AKT's decision in that case is reversed. In dismissing the 
^24 PERB f3024 (1992), conf'd, 187 A.D.2d 78, 26 PERB [^7001 (2d 
Dep't 1993) . 
-''Our rationale for the dismissal of the Police and Firemen's 
Associations' charges would apply equally to IBT's charges were 
we to reach their merits. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-1247 6 
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BRUCE of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RONALD J. LEVINSON, ESQ. (FRANCESCA M. CAPITANO of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After 
a hearing, the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge against the Town of 
Hempstead (Town), which alleges that the Town violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
subcontracting unit work to a private company. The ALJ dismissed 
the charge as untimely pursuant to §204.7(1) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), which provides: 
A motion may be made to dismiss a charge, or the 
administrative law judge may dismiss a charge on the 
ground that the alleged violation occurred more than 
four months prior to the filing of the charge, but only 
if the failure of timeliness was first revealed during 
the hearing. An objection to the timeliness of the 
charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived. 
Board - U-12476 -2 
Based upon facts first disclosed at the hearing, the ALT 
concluded that CSEA had actual notice that the subcontractor was 
doing bargaining unit work in October 1990. As the charge was 
not filed until May 1991, the ALJ held that it was plainly 
untimely under Rules §204.1(a)(1), which establishes a four-month 
filing period. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that §204.7(1) does not permit 
the ALJ to raise timeliness on his own motion because the facts 
establishing the untimeliness of the charge were either known to 
or could have been discovered by the Town before the hearing. 
CSEA argues that §204.7(1) only applies in instances in which a 
respondent does not have or could not have discovered facts 
before the hearing which support an affirmative defense of 
untimeliness, which is required to be raised in a respondent's 
answer by Rules §204.3(c)(2).^ 
The Town in its response argues that the ALT's decision is 
correct on the facts and the interpretation of the Rules and 
should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
Section 204.7(1) and the amendment to §204.3(c)(2), 
requiring untimeliness to be pleaded in a respondent's answer, 
-'That section of the Rules requires a respondent's answer to 
include a "specific, detailed statement of any affirmative 
defense, including but not limited to an allegation that the 
violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of 
the charge." 
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were effective the same date in 1977. These amendments were 
intended to clarify and modify our consideration of the 
timeliness of charges. The amendments to the applicable Rules 
sprang from the Board's decision in Town of Haverstraw,-1 
decided on December 1, 1976. In that case, the Board held that a 
union had failed to negotiate in good faith.-f On motion for 
reargument and reconsideration, the union established that its 
misconduct occurred more than four months before the charge was 
filed. Reversing its original decision and dismissing the charge 
as untimely, the Board rejected the charging party's arguments 
that timeliness was strictly in the nature of an affirmative 
defense that had to be raised or waived. The Board, however, 
observed that the charging party had made persuasive arguments 
favoring amendments to the Rules which the Board promised to 
study. 
Section 204.2(a), pertaining to the Director's initial 
processing of a charge, was also amended simultaneously with the 
amendments to §204.7(1) and §204.3(c)(2). Under the amendment to 
§204.2(a), the Director is specifically instructed to dismiss a 
charge if it is determined "that the alleged violation occurred 
more than four months prior to the filing of the charge." 
The interrelationship between and among these three 
timeliness provisions was explained in Westburv Teachers 
^9 PERB 53082 (1976). 
5/9 PERB 53063 (1976) . 
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Association.-; The Director is to dismiss a charge when 
untimeliness is apparent on the face of the charge. In this 
case, untimeliness was not apparent from the charge as filed. To 
the contrary, based upon CSEA's pleading that it did not learn of 
the subcontracting until April 1991, the charge was plainly 
timely on its face. Therefore, it was properly processed by the 
Director pursuant to Rules §204.2(a). 
The requirement imposed upon the Director to dismiss an 
untimely charge in advance of any answer from a respondent 
preserved that aspect of many of PERB's earlier decisions under 
which timeliness is not exclusively an affirmative defense. The 
amendments to §204.7(1) and §204.3(c)(2) clarified, however, that 
a lack of timeliness is not strictly jurisdictional. Therefore, 
timeliness under the amended Rules could not be raised by anyone 
at any time, even after decision, as occurred in Town of 
Haverstrawr supra. If timeliness was not raised in a 
respondent's answer, it could be raised either by the respondent 
or an ALT, but only if the untimeliness of the charge was first 
revealed during the hearing. Section 204.7(1) was clearly 
intended to permit an ALJ to dismiss an untimely charge under a 
limited circumstance apart from any action taken or not taken by 
a respondent to preserve the agency's separate interest in 
preventing or discouraging the litigation of untimely charges. 
As we said in Westbury Teachers Association, in promulgating 
^15 PERB 5[3099 (1982). 
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§204.7(1), we intended to retain "both the Director's and the 
[ALJ's] authority to raise [timeliness] on their own 
initiative".-'' 
We have, as correctly recognized by the ALJ, approved an 
ALJ's dismissal of a charge after a hearing where the facts 
establishing the untimeliness of the charge were first revealed 
to the ALJ during the hearing in circumstances in which those 
facts were unquestionably either known to or could have been 
reasonably discovered by a respondent which had failed to raise 
untimeliness in its answer.-7 Even assuming the truth of CSEA's 
assertion that the Town knew or should have known that CSEA's 
charge was untimely, that circumstance has not been regarded as 
relevant to an ALJ's invocation of existing §204.7(1). 
It is perhaps arguable that a respondent's ability to 
ascertain before the hearing the facts establishing the 
untimeliness of a charge should bar the respondent from raising 
untimeliness by motion in response to facts disclosed on the 
record at a hearing. Whatever arguable misfeasance there may be 
in a respondent's failure to investigate adequately a charge for 
purposes of preparing its defense, the right specifically 
reserved to an ALJ in §204.7(1) to dismiss a charge if the ALJ 
^Id. at 3151. 
^Wells Cent. Sch. Dist.. 16 PERB f3107 (1983). 
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first becomes aware at a hearing that the charge is, in fact, 
untimely, remains intact. 
CSEA also argues that an ALJ should not be allowed to 
dismiss a charge as untimely after a hearing closes. It is after 
a hearing and receipt and review of the transcript and the 
parties' briefs, however, that an ALJ may be best prepared to 
rule on any issue. In this case, after his review of the record, 
the ALJ put the parties on notice of the timeliness issue, they 
each briefed that issue without offer of further evidence and 
CSEA has not taken any exceptions to the ALJ's finding that the 
charge is, in fact, untimely. We find nothing in §204.7(1) that 
would permit and require an ALJ to dismiss an untimely charge 
only during the hearing process and no prejudice to CSEA in the 
ALJ's making that dispositive ruling by post-hearing decision 
after notice. 
Our dismissal of this charge does not mean that 
consideration should not be given to amending the Rules further 
to permit dismissals for untimeliness, after the Director's 
initial screening, only pursuant to an affirmative defense 
properly raised by a respondent, as CSEA argues. However, the 
Rules as presently written and consistently interpreted 
necessitate a dismissal of this charge. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and CSEA's exceptions are denied. 
Board - U-12476 -7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cha irperson 
Walter JW. Eisenberq, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONEONTA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-127 60 
CITY OF ONEONTA, 
Respondent. 
CHRISTOPHER GARDNER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
DAVID S. MERZIG, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Oneonta (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
sustaining a charge filed by the Oneonta Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA) alleging that the City had violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
unilaterally imposing upon certain unit members a new physical 
examination procedure, which included a Physical Efficiency 
Battery (PEB), a physical fitness testing procedure. 
The ALJ found that the City had violated the Act as alleged 
and ordered the procedure rescinded. 
The City excepts to the ALJ's determination on several 
grounds, the main two of which are that the charge is untimely 
and that the procedure, as implemented, relates to its mission. 
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Since 1986, the City has had an interest in requiring some 
sort of physical fitness testing or evaluation of unit 
employees.-f In December 1990, the City and the PBA began 
discussions at their monthly labor-management meetings regarding 
a physical fitness evaluation method. These discussions 
continued for several months on the premise that employees hired 
before March 12, 1990, would not be required to participate in 
the PEB. During this time frame, the parties also completed 
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement for the term 
January 1, 1991 to December 30, 1993. The contract was executed 
on February 21, 1991. It contains the following provision as 
Article XXX: 
FITNESS STANDARDS 
The purpose of the Article is to set forth minimum 
fitness standards which must be met by all employees 
covered by this Agreement hired on or after March 12, 
1990. It is agreed and understood that employees 
covered by this agreement hired before March 12, 1990 
are exempt from this or any other fitness requirement, 
such as MPTC standards. 
In 1986, the PBA filed an improper practice charge 
(Case No. U-8599) alleging that the City had unilaterally 
imposed an assessment test. That charge was withdrawn after 
certain agreements were made between the PBA and the City 
regarding the use of the test results and further testing. 
In 1990, a second imprpper practice charge (Case No. U-
11790) was filed after the City passed a local law requiring 
that minimum fitness standards be met by unit members. That 
charge was also withdrawn, after the City conceded that it 
was obligated to negotiate in good faith regarding both 
fitness and discipline procedures. 
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Covered employees will be tested on an annual 
basis for fitness levels in the following categories: 
A.) Flexibility 
B.) Body Composition 
C.) Strength 
D.) Cardiovascular (Aerobic) 
E.) Agility 
These--tests_w.il.L_be- administered_and_rated—in 
accordance with the fitness levels as developed by the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). The 
covered employees must meet the minimum of 50% as 
established by FLETC. 
Covered employees who fail to meet these minimum 
standards will be retested within six months. It is 
understood that covered employees who do not meet the 
minimum standards after retesting shall be subject to 
the protections of due process as granted under the 
Civil Service Law. 
Modifications of this Article will be made only as 
the result of mutual agreement among the members of the 
Labor-Management Committee. 
At the April 15, 1991 labor-management meeting, John Insetta, 
the City's Personnel Director, announced for the first time that 
the City wanted the PEB to be mandatory for all unit members. 
Allen Taylor, the PBA President, so advised PBA members, who 
voted to reject such a plan. At the May 7, 1991 labor-management 
meeting, Taylor told Insetta that the PBA had rejected the City's 
PEB proposal. Insetta proposed the following language at that 
meeting: 
The assessment component of the physical will be 
mandatory for all members of the police department 
during the 1991 physical. Subsequent annual physicals 
will contain an optional assessment component for all 
police officers hired prior to March 1990. The 
assessment component will remain mandatory for police 
officers hired after March 1990. 
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It is understood that the assessment component 
could remain mandatory for all police officers, however 
the employer elects to make this component of the 
physical optional after 1991. The employer hopes that 
all members will continue to avail themselves of the 
benefits of the assessment component of the physical. 
It is understood that all police officers, for 
whom the assessment component will become optional, 
will_exercise_a_reasonable_effort_J:o_determine_a_ciear 
picture of their physical state. If an officer is not 
exercising a reasonable effort that officer will repeat 
the assessment annually until a reasonable effort is 
obtained. (A reasonable effort will be defined as the 
attainment of 50%). 
No agreement between the City and the PBA was reached at 
that meeting. On May 30, 1991, the Chief of Police issued a 
memorandum which stated: 
DATE: MAY 30, 1991 
TO: ALL OFFICERS HIRED BEFORE MARCH 1990 
FROM: CHIEF DONADIO 
SUBJECT: PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
MESSAGE: IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE FOR A MORE 
COMPREHENSIVE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION, AND AFTER 
CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE 
FOLLOWING PROCEDURE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ON OR ABOUT 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1991. 
A SCHEDULE OF OFFICERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER 
TO PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY PROCESS OF ADMINISTERING THE 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION, AS MANDATED BY ARTICLE XVII 
SECTION C OF THE BUREAU OF POLICE DUTIES RULES & 
REGULATIONS MANUAL AND AS SUGGESTED BY THE MUNICIPAL 
POLICE TRAINING COUNCIL OF DCJS. 
AT THE REQUEST OF MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT, AND THE 
PBA AND SBA, THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WILL BE 
ADMINISTERED ON AN ANNUAL BASIS, SUBJECT TO THE POLICE 
CHIEF'S APPROVAL. THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WILL 
INCLUDE: 
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A MEDICAL HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE TO BE 
COMPLETED BY EACH OFFICER; 
A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY A 
MEDICAL DOCTOR ON EACH OFFICER; 
A SERIES OF TESTS ADMINISTERED TO EACH 
OFFICER TO INCLUDE: 
a BLOQD_TESI 
b. URINALYSIS 
c. ASSESSMENT (PHYSICAL EFFICIENCY 
BATTERY, PEB); 
THE MEDICAL DOCTOR WILL ADVISE THE POLICE 
CHIEF AS TO WHETHER THE OFFICER IS CLEARED TO 
PERFORM ALL OR PART OF THE PEB; 
THE RESULTS OF ALL THE TESTS WILL REMAIN WITH 
THE DEPARTMENT DOCTOR AND WILL BE DISCUSSED 
DIRECTLY WITH THE OFFICER. 
ANY DISABLING ILLNESS OR INJURY WILL BE 
REPORTED TO THE PERSONNEL OFFICER FOR FURTHER 
ACTION. 
The new procedure, which made the assessment component applicable 
to all unit members, contains an implementation date of 
September 1, 1991. However, pending the outcome of these 
proceedings, the procedure has not been enforced. 
For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ's decision must be 
reversed and the charge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Although not pled as an affirmative defense and while no 
exceptions were filed regarding jurisdiction, "we are obliged to 
reach that issue because it concerns our power to entertain the 
[§209-a.l(d) allegation set forth in the charge and litigated by 
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the parties]".-' Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides that the 
Board 
shall not have authority to enforce an agreement 
between an employer and an employee organization and 
shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization_practice. 
Article XXX of the contract, which was attached to the 
amended charge, and which was part of the contract entered into 
evidence at the hearing, provides that employees hired before 
March 12, 1990, are exempt from the physical assessment component 
of the City's physical examination procedure. The Article 
further provides that modifications of the Article will be the 
result of agreements reached by the labor-management committee. 
Although not pled by the parties nor raised by the ALJ, it is 
clear that the PBA's claim of right in this case is plainly and 
firmly grounded in the specific language of the parties' current 
collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the agreement includes 
not only the exemption for the employees hired before March 12, 
1990, but also an agreed-upon mechanism for the modification of 
the physical examination-physical assessment procedure. To the 
extent that the May 30, 1991 memorandum from the Chief of Police 
extends the coverage of the procedure to all unit members, it 
raises only a breach of contract claim, which the PBA would have 
us remedy by enforcing the terms of the agreement. It is clear 
that the parties have already bargained and reached agreement on 
11
 City of Albany. 25 PERB ^3006, at 3020 (1992). 
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the subject matter of the charge and the allegations set forth 
therein cannot, in light of the contract language, be read to set 
forth a separate violation under the Act. As such, the charge 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to 
the parties7 rights and obligations under the contract. 
Having decided that we do not have jurisdiction, we do not 
consider the City's exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Long Beach Classroom Teachers 
Association, NYSUT (Association) and the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of Long Beach (District) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed the Association's improper practice 
charge which alleges that the District violated §2 09-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
subcontracting its driver education program to a private 
contractor (SCOPE). 
The ALJ dismissed the Association's charge upon his 
conclusion that the District did not subcontract its driver 
'^ 1 
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education program to SCOPE but, rather, exercised its managerial 
prerogative to abolish the program altogether.-'' According to 
the ALJ, SCOPE'S program is independent of the District. The 
Association's exceptions and the District's response thereto are 
directed to the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
this point. The ALJ also found that the District's driver 
education program was exclusive unit work to the extent unit 
employees were available to teach. The District's cross-
exceptions and the Association's responses are directed to the 
ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. 
FACTS 
Section 507.1 of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law 
) (VTL) provides, inter alia, that persons who are seventeen years 
old may be issued a class D or class M driver's license upon the 
successful completion of an approved driver education course "in 
a high school or college." Pursuant to the VTL, such driver 
education programs consist of two elements: classroom 
instruction and on-the-road or "behind-the-wheel" training. 
Classroom instruction must be taught by a person who has been 
approved by the State Education Department and the Commissioner 
of Motor Vehicles. "However, a school district may contract with 
one or more licensed drivers schools to provide behind-the-wheel 
training, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner 
[of Motor Vehicles]." The VTL also provides that "every student 
''
 I7Citv Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle. 4 PERB f3 050 
(1971). 
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who successfully completes such course in a day, evening or 
summer school program offered by a public or private school shall 
receive certification of such completion on a certificate 
prescribed by the Commissioner [of Motor Vehicles]." 
Until September 1991, the District offered a driver 
education program in accordance with §507.1 of the VTL. However, 
according to Dorothy McGarvey, Assistant Superintendent of 
Schools, "SCOPE approached our school district . . . during the 
'90-'91 school year offering to furnish this program for us." 
Thereafter, on August 23, 1991, the District's Board of Education 
adopted a resolution entitled "Adoption of SCOPE Driver and 
Traffic Safety Education Program: 1991-92 School Year." 
The school board's resolution authorized SCOPE "to provide a 
driver and traffic safety education program in the . . . District 
[from] September 1, 1991 to August 31, 1992, with the 
understanding that SCOPE will provide the program utilizing 
sponsorship funds generated from the public." In other words, 
the students, not the District, pay SCOPE for the program. 
The school board's resolution further charges the high 
school principal "with the responsibility of overseeing the 
quality of the program and submitting all appropriate forms to 
the New York State Education Department including MV 285 'blue 
cards.'" The "MV 285" form is the form prescribed by §507.1 of 
the VTL and is the District's certification to the New York State 
Education Department that the students passed the course. Once 
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the certification is filed, the students are entitled to greater 
driving privileges than they would have otherwise. 
A description of SCOPE'S driver education program was given 
to Frank Volpe, President of the Association, by the District's 
Superintendent of Schools in response to Volpe's request for 
information concerning the program SCOPE would be providing. The 
description shows that SCOPE'S arrangement with the District is 
on an annual basis "for as long as the program will be required." 
SCOPE requires that the District "appoint a principal or other 
appropriate school person to act as a liaison with SCOPE and to 
supervise the program for the school district." While SCOPE 
hires the teachers, "the District or District liaison will 
) confirm their qualifications." The District is to "cooperate 
with SCOPE to provide promotion of the program to the families of 
eligible students." Moreover, "in cooperation with the District, 
SCOPE will provide limited 'scholarship' funds for students who 
cannot afford to pay the fees." These students are to be 
"identified and confirmed by the District involved." 
Pursuant to its arrangement with the District, the classroom 
element of SCOPE'S driver education program is taught in District 
classrooms and the road work departs from and terminates at the 
school building. This "behind-the-wheel" training is provided by 
Bell Auto School, apparently a private drivers school, as 
authorized by §507.1 of the VTL. Unlike the District's driver 
education program, all of SCOPE'S classes are taught after school 
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hours.-' Students receive no high school credit for 
successfully completing the course, and they must pay SCOPE for 
the program. 
Until the District entered into its arrangement with SCOPE, 
the classroom element of the District's driver education program 
was exclusively taught by one unit teacher as part of his regular 
salaried teaching load. The "behind-the-wheel" classes were 
treated as extracurricular classes and compensated on an hourly 
basis: The District has consistently offered unit employees the 
opportunity to teach the "behind-the-wheel" classes at the 
negotiated wage rate of $35 per hour. Only if there were an 
insufficient number of qualified unit employees to teach did the 
District offer the work outside of the bargaining unit.-7 Thus, 
according to McGarvey, during two of the three years preceding 
the arrangement with SCOPE, one of the three teachers of the 
"behind-the-wheel" element was not a unit employee.-1 These 
nonunit employees were also paid $35 per hour to teach. 
-/when the District was offering the program, classroom 
instruction was taught during school hours, while behind-the-
wheel instruction was provided after school hours. 
-/Article VI of the parties7 collective bargaining agreement, 
entitled "Vacancies," provides: "nothing contained in this 
agreement shall limit or restrict the Board from considering 
concurrently applications from other than staff or from making 
appointments of such new applicants" so long as notices of 
vacancies are posted. 
-/During the school year immediately preceding the arrangement 
with SCOPE, a nonunit employee taught one of the "behind-the-
wheel" classes, and during one of the two years prior to that, 
another nonunit teacher taught one of these classes. 
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When the District entered into its arrangement with SCOPE, 
two qualified unit employees who were available to teach for the 
District were offered employment with SCOPE. One accepted, and 
he is now teaching the classroom element for SCOPE at a 
significantly lower rate of pay than the District had paid. 
DISCUSSION 
In dismissing the charge, the ALJ held that the District has 
no control over the program that SCOPE now offers. He also 
determined that the role of the principal in certifying the 
successful completion of the course to the New York State 
Education Department is merely a "ministerial" function. We 
disagree with these conclusions. 
From our review of the record, we find that the District has 
not discontinued the delivery of driver education to its 
constituency. Simply put, SCOPE offered to provide the same 
service as before at no cost to the District and the District 
accepted. SCOPE is merely the District's agent for the delivery 
of the same service the District had previously provided itself. 
The high school principal's responsibility to ensure that the 
program meets the District's standards and to certify to the 
New York State Department of Education the successful completion 
of SCOPE'S program establish that the District has retained 
control over the educational service that SCOPE is providing. 
Moreover, such certification shows that the educational program 
is still offered in accordance with §507.1 of the VTL. Finally, 
that the District's arrangement with SCOPE is renewable annually 
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shows that SCOPE is not independent of the District. Indeed, 
absent this symbiotic relationship, SCOPE could not offer driver 
education in accordance with §507.1 of the VTL, which requires 
that such programs be offered through a public or private high 
school or college. 
The description of SCOPE'S program, given to Volpe, further 
supports our conclusion that SCOPE is providing driver education 
on behalf of the District. The role of the District in 
certifying the qualifications of the teachers whom SCOPE hires 
and its identification of students in need of scholarship funds 
clearly show that SCOPE'S relationship with the District is, at 
least, interdependent. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find, contrary to the ALJ, that 
the District is continuing to offer driver education to its 
constituency through SCOPE. The facts that the students pay 
SCOPE and receive no high school credit for the program are not 
dispositive. Many programs offered by a school district, such as 
athletics, are not for credit, and other programs, such as food 
services, are paid for by students. 
Having determined that the District is still providing 
driver education to its constituency, we now turn to whether the 
assignment of such work to SCOPE violated the Act. 
The District's exclusive utilization of a unit employee to 
teach the classroom element of its driver education program and 
its annual offer to unit employees of the opportunity to teach 
the roadwork element establish its recognition that the work 
'^  
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primarily belongs to bargaining unit personnel. Indeed, we find 
that its annual offer of such employment before hiring nonunit 
personnel is an affirmation of this recognition. Moreover, under 
these circumstances, we find that the utilization of nonunit 
personnel when an insufficient number of unit employees was 
available to teach was at the Association's sufferance and, 
therefore, does not constitute an elimination of the work from 
the bargaining unit nor a relinquishment of its rights to 
negotiate concerning the work involved.-7 Indeed, the nonunit 
personnel whom the District utilized from time to time to teach 
the roadwork portion of its driver education program could not 
even become members of the unit because they did not work the 
minimum number of hours necessary to meet the contractual 
definition of a unit employee.-7 
Because both parties understood the teaching of the 
District's driver education program to be unit work, we find that 
the District's unilateral discontinuance of the use of unit 
employees to perform the work, to the extent such employees were 
available, constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
^Compare County of Erie, 17 PERB [^3067 (1984) , aff'g 17 PERB 
14551, at 4607 (1984), where "there [was] no record evidence that 
the respondent was obligated, by practice or contract, to appoint 
unit employees to the nonunit . . . positions." 
-'According to Stephen Broncatello, one of the driver education 
teachers, a roadwork teacher would teach a total of 384 hours 
during the school year, or approximately ten hours each week. 
The contractual recognition clause provides a threshold 
definition for unit employees as those who work a minimum of 
twenty hours per week. 
Board - U-13047 -9 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are granted, the District's cross-exceptions are 
dismissed, and the ALT's decision is reversed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District to: 
1. Restore its practice of exclusively using unit 
employees to teach the classroom element of its driver 
education program, should it continue to provide driver 
education to its constituency. 
Restore its practice of utilizing qualified unit 
employees to teach the roadwork portion of its driver 
education program, to the extent such employees are 
available, should it continue to provide driver 
education to its constituency. 
Make those unit employees who were available to teach, 
and who would have taught driver education for the 
District, whole for any wages or benefits lost as a 
result of the District's utilization of SCOPE, with 
interest on any sums owing at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
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4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
X&\A_ ^ tf-j, M(W Ut 
Pauline R. Kinsella,__Chairperson 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Membe 
"Eric JA Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the City School District of the City of Long Beach in the bargaining unit represented by 
the Long Beach Teachers Association that the District: 
1. Will restore its practice of exclusively using unit employees to teach the classroom element of its driver 
education program, should it continue to provide driver education to its constituency. 
2. Will restore its practice of utilizing qualified unit employees to teach the roadwork portion of its driver 
education program, to the extent such employees are available, should it continue to provide driver education 
to its constituency. 
3. Will make those unit employees who were available to teach, and who would have taught driver education 
for the District, whole for any wages or benefits lost as a result of the District's utilization of SCOPE, with 
interest on any sums owing at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
City. School. District, of. the .City. of. Long Beach 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Suffolk County Local 852, Town 
of Brookhaven Blue Collar Unit (CSEA) and the Town of Brookhaven 
(Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). As 
filed, CSEA's charge alleges that the Town violated §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
subcontracted the transportation of garbage and trash from 
certain transfer stations to the disposal point. During the 
hearing, CSEA moved to amend its charge to allege a violation of 
§209-a.l(c), which the ALT granted in his decision. He denied, 
however, CSEA's post-hearing request to substitute a violation of 
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§209-a.l(a) for the alleged violation of §209-a.l(c) as alleged 
in its motion to amend. 
The ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation on a finding 
that the work performed by the employees of the private 
contractor, Star Recycling, Inc. (Star), was not substantially 
similar to that performed by CSEA's unit employees. He dismissed 
the §209-a.l(c) allegation on a finding that there was not 
sufficient evidence to establish that the subcontracting was 
improperly motivated, a finding, he noted, which would equally 
necessitate dismissal of the §209-a.l(a) allegation, even had the 
charge been amended in that respect. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALT erred in denying 
its motion to add a §209-a.l(a) allegation and in finding, 
alternatively, that there was insufficient evidence in support of 
that allegation. It also argues that the ALT was mistaken in 
finding that Star transports the ash from incinerated garbage and 
trash back to the Town. CSEA claims that Star only transports 
garbage and trash to the Town of Hempstead where it is 
incinerated. Lastly, CSEA argues that the ALT erred in finding 
that the work performed by Star employees was not substantially 
similar to the work performed by unit employees. 
The Town, in cross-exceptions, argues that the ALT erred in 
granting the amendment to add the §209-a.l(c) allegation and in 
not deciding whether the contract with Star, as performed, 
represented a change in the Town's level of services which the 
Town need not have bargained with CSEA. In its response to 
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CSEA's exceptions, the Town admits that Star does not haul ash 
back to the Town, but argues that the ALJ's findings of fact are 
otherwise correct, as is his conclusion regarding the 
dissimilarity of the work, despite his one factual error. 
CSEA, in its response to the Town's cross-exceptions, argues 
that the ALJ properly granted the motion to add the §209-a.1(c) 
cause of action and was correct in not finding that the Town had 
changed its level of services. 
We consider first the exceptions to the ALJ's rulings on the 
amendments. The decision to grant or deny an amendment to a 
charge is normally a matter reserved to an ALJ's discretion,^ 
to be exercised consistently with basic due process 
considerations and within certain limits we have fixed by case 
law.-' In that regard, we affirm the ALJ's ruling granting the 
amendment to add the §209-a.l(c) allegation. That motion, based 
upon facts brought out for the first time by the Town's own 
witnesses, was made during the hearing and merely conformed the 
pleading to the record evidence. Moreover, the charge as filed 
gave the Town notice of the transactions or occurrences which are 
the subject of the granted amendment.-7 Being limited to the 
^Village of Johnson Citv. 12 PERB J[3020 (1979) . 
-'For example, we have held generally that an amendment may not 
be granted if it adds a time barred cause of action. Public 
Employees Fed'n (Muragali) . 14 PERB [^3036 (1981) ; Brookhaven-
Comsewocrue Union Free Sch. Dist. , 9 PERB f3012 (1976) . 
-
7See, e.g. . State of New York (Dep't of Transp.), 23 PERB ^ [3005 
(1990), conf'd, 174 A.D.2d 905, 24 PERB f7014 (3d Dep't 1991). 
Board - U-13165 -4 
evidence in the record which, in relevant respect, was in the 
Town's sole possession, the ALJ's granting of the amendment 
adding the §209-a.l(c) allegation was not error. 
The Town's reliance upon another recent decision involving 
it is misplaced.-7 In that case, we denied a motion to amend a 
charge which would have added an untimely cause of action 
entirely different from the one pleaded. Unlike this case, to 
have granted the amendment in the other case would have 
necessitated a reopening of the hearing because the facts 
supporting the amendment were completely different from the facts 
supporting the charge as filed. In effect, we did not consider 
the granting of an amendment in that case to be consistent with 
due process or the orderly litigation of the charge. The 
circumstances of this case, as already noted, are simply 
different and readily distinguished. 
We also affirm the ALJ's ruling denying the §209-a.l(a) 
amendment. Both the §209-a.l(a) allegation and the §209-a.l(c) 
allegation are based upon the Town's alleged improper motivation. 
The addition or substitution of an interference allegation for 
the discrimination allegation would not have affected the 
analysis of fact or law in this case nor would it have affected 
the potential remedy. In effect, the second motion to amend was 
redundant of the first. In such circumstances, we cannot 
^Town of Brookhaven, 25 PERB ^3077 (1992). 
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conclude that the AKT erred by denying the post-hearing motion. 
For this reason, CSEA's exception in this regard is denied. 
Moreover, we are concerned, as was the ALJ, by the delay in 
making the second motion. A review of the record does not 
disclose that there was any reason why the motion to add or 
substitute the §209-a.l(a) allegation could not have been made 
during the hearing as was the first motion. Fairness requires 
that parties make any motion concerning the causes of action in a 
charge at the first available opportunity and we would not 
lightly disturb an ALJ's declination to accept a post-hearing 
motion without evidence of good cause for the delay. 
We further affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the §209-a.l(c) 
allegation.-' CSEA's argument that the Town was improperly 
motivated in entering the contract with Star rests entirely upon 
certain testimony by Frank Faber, the Town's Deputy Supervisor, 
regarding the reasons which factored into the Town's decision to 
subcontract. Faber testified that, among other benefits, the 
contract with Star afforded it more flexibility in the sense that 
it could immediately terminate the services of an undesirable 
driver for Star, something it did not have the latitude to do 
with CSEA unit employees, except during their probationary 
periods. From this alone, CSEA would have us draw the inference 
that the Town subcontracted with Star because the Town's 
employees had chosen to organize and had collectively bargained 
-''Our rationale would equally necessitate the dismissal of the 
§209-a.l(a) allegation under the theory offered here by CSEA. 
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for certain job security provisions. The record, however, shows 
that the Town had several reasons for subcontracting. The record 
as a whole simply does not warrant a conclusion that the contract 
with Star would not have been entered into but for the fact the 
Town's employees had exercised their statutorily protected rights 
to organize and to bargain collectively through CSEA. 
This brings us to the ALT's dismissal of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation. As noted, the ALT held that the work performed by 
Star personnel is not substantially similar to the work performed 
by unit employees. Substantial similarity of the work is an 
element to be established by the charging party in a charge 
grounded upon a unilateral transfer of unit work.-7 The ALJ 
concluded that unit employees had only transported garbage and 
trash within Town limits. According to the ALT, the "transport 
of trash outside of Town limits, to a final point of destination 
in another municipality, and the transfer of the residue ash to 
the Town, is not the type of work which had been previously 
performed by unit employees." 
The ALJ's conclusion in this respect is based in part upon a 
mistake of fact. The parties agree that Star does not haul 
residue ash back from Hempstead to the Town. We do not consider 
this error, however, to be material to our disposition of the 
charge because we disagree with the ALT's conclusion in this 
respect even on the facts as found by the ALT. 
'Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB f3083 (1985). 
i ^ 
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In agreement with CSEA, we find the unit work to be simply 
the tasks associated with the transportation of garbage and 
trash. The tasks involved in the transportation of garbage and 
trash and the qualifications for the performance of those tasks 
have not been changed by virtue of the fact that garbage and 
trash is now taken outside the Town lines.^ There is no 
demonstrable relationship between the particular geographic 
location to which garbage and trash is taken and the employees' 
job duties which are associated with the tasks of hauling that 
material. Therefore, the ALT incorrectly held that the hauling 
of garbage and trash outside Town lines is a component of either 
the definition of the unit work or a factor in assessing the 
substantial similarity of employees7 tasks.-7 
Given the basis for the ALT's disposition of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation, he did not consider whether CSEA had exclusivity over 
the work subcontracted nor did he decide whether the record facts 
supported the Town's claim that it changed its level of services 
or otherwise made a managerial decision in entering the contract 
with Star. The resolution of these fact questions, including any 
necessary credibility resolutions, and any conclusion based 
thereon, are appropriately made in the first instance by the ALT. 
1
 See, e.g., Town of Smithtown, 25 PERB f3081 (1992) . 
g/Citv of Buffalo, 24 PERB 53043 (1991). We do not suggest, 
however, that the change in the location to which garbage and 
trash is taken is necessarily irrelevant for all purposes. That 
is a determination to be made initially by the ALT in considering 
the parties' other arguments pursuant to our remand. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to remand the case in relevant part 
to the ALT for subsequent decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALT's rulings regarding 
the §209-a.l(a) and (c) allegations are affirmed and the charge 
in those respects is dismissed. The ALT's decision dismissing 
the §209-a.l(d) allegation is reversed. The portion of the 
charge alleging a §209-a.l(d) violation is remanded to the ALT 
for subsequent decision consistent with our decision herein. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Member *" 
ric J/ Schmertz, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of 
Greenport (Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT). The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) alleges in its charge that the 
Village violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it discharged unit employee Mark 
Begora because he filed contract grievances.-7 
-''The ALJ's decision also covered a second charge filed by CSEA 
against the Village. The ALJ held under that charge (U-13 351) 
that the Village abolished a position held by unit president 
Dennis Dowling because, as unit president, he exercised 
statutorily protected rights to represent unit employees in 
negotiations and grievances. The District has reinstated Dowling 
to his position and, accordingly, it has withdrawn the exceptions 
it had filed to the ALJ's decision in U-13351. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ found that the Village had violated 
the Act as alleged. In doing so, the ALJ rejected the Village's 
defense that Begora was discharged on directive from the local 
civil service commission because he had not obtained a necessary 
license within the allotted time. 
The Village argues in its exceptions that the record does 
not support the ALJ's finding of a violation and that his 
remedial order is inappropriate. In its response, CSEA argues 
that the ALJ's decision and order are correct and should be 
affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision, but modify the remedial order. 
The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Accordingly, 
the parties' arguments are focused upon the reasonableness of the 
conclusions which the ALJ drew from those facts. 
We agree with the ALJ that the Village's actions regarding 
Begora were patterned around and coincided with his grievances. 
For example, the Village had not investigated his status with the 
civil service commission until after his first grievance was 
filed on September 23, 1991 seeking a salary increase for having 
completed a correspondence course in the operation of wastewater 
treatment plants. This course, however, did not result in 
Begora's certification by the Department of Environmental 
Conservation as the civil service commission said was required by 
the State Sanitary Code. The County civil service commission by 
letter dated November 1 informed the Village that Begora had to 
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be terminated immediately because he lacked the necessary 
certificate. The Village, however, decided not to terminate 
Begora and instead informed him by letter dated November 22, 
1991, that it would seek an extension to enable him to remain in 
his position until the next licensing examination, for which he 
would have to assume all related expenses. Only two relevant 
events occurred after that date. Based upon a claimed 
contractual entitlement to reimbursement, CSEA demanded that the 
Village pay for Begora's training and examination, costs 
estimated at approximately $1,600, a demand which was 
incorporated into a formal grievance dated December 16, 1991. In 
that respect, we further agree with the ALJ that the Village, 
through its Mayor, William Pell, knew on December 16, 1991 that a 
grievance had been filed. The second event is a letter, dated 
December 16, written by Allen Smith, the Village's attorney, that 
recommends Begora's immediate termination for his failure to 
comply with the licensing requirements. CSEA argues that the 
second grievance ultimately caused the Village to terminate 
Begora. The Village argues that it relied on the advice of its 
attorney and the local civil service commission to terminate 
Begora. 
The question before us and the ALJ is simply which of these 
events caused the Village on December 30, 1991, to meet in 
special session and vote to terminate Begora, effective thirty 
days later. Of the two, the first is by far the more likely. 
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The Village's vote on December 30 reflects that it was based 
on the letter from the local civil service commission of 
November 1, 1991. The Village, however, was fully aware of that 
letter, which was not subject to misinterpretation, when it 
decided to permit Begora to remain in his position until he could 
get the necessary license. It is extremely implausible that the 
Village, on December 30, would have been persuaded to act based 
on the same advice it had disregarded shortly before. As Pell 
knew about the December 16 grievance, it is immaterial whether 
Smith knew about it when he wrote to inform CSEA that he was 
recommending Begora's termination. We are left, therefore, only 
with the conclusion that Begora had established himself by the 
first and second grievances as a person who was willing to 
contest the Village's employment decisions and the Village ridded 
itself of that burden. 
Our conclusion in this respect is strongly buttressed, as 
was the ALT's, by Pell's comment to Dowling in February 1992 when 
Dowling presented Pell with yet a third grievance from Begora 
protesting his termination. According to Dowling's unrebutted 
testimony, Pell laughed, and said that he thought he had already 
taken care of all of Begora's grievances. Pell's laughter and 
his reference to "all grievances" are not consistent with an 
innocent reference to the fact that one of Begora's grievances 
had been settled in late November by the extension of a pay raise 
he had sought. Rather, we see Pell's conduct and remarks as 
Pell's attempt to ensure that Dowling understood that he and the 
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Village had unburdened themselves of an employee who had 
demonstrated a determination to hold the Village to its 
obligations under contract and law. 
The Village also excepts to the ALJ's remedial order as it 
applies to Begora. The ALJ ordered the Village to offer Begora 
reinstatement to a position substantially equivalent to his 
former position, if one were available. The ALJ also ordered 
back pay from the date of Begora's termination to the date the 
Village offers him reinstatement. 
Our remedial orders are guided by the primary and simple 
philosophy that an employee is to be placed as nearly as possible 
in the position he or she would have been had it not been for 
whatever improper conduct is found. The appropriate remedy in 
this case is complicated because on the information available to 
us on this record, Begora lacks the necessary license or 
certificate for appointment to his former position. The ALJ 
ordered Begora appointed to a substantially equivalent position 
because, being unqualified for his former position, we could not 
order him reinstated to it. We do not consider, however, this to 
be either necessary or appropriate to remedy the Village's 
violation of the Act. There is nothing in the record which would 
suggest that the Village ever had any intention of continuing 
Begora in a different position if he failed to obtain the 
necessary license. We have found, however, that but for his 
protected activities, the Village would have kept Begora in his 
former position until the results of the next licensing examining 
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were announced. Covering the several possible contingencies, we 
believe that the following order is most appropriate. 
If Begora is now licensed in accordance with applicable law 
and regulation, the Village is ordered to offer him immediate 
reinstatement to his former position with full back pay. If 
Begora is not currently licensed in accordance with applicable 
law and regulation, the Village is ordered to pay him back pay 
from the date of his termination through the date the test 
results are announced for the next scheduled and available 
examination. Should Begora obtain the necessary license as a 
result of that examination, the Village is ordered to reinstate 
him to his former position with the accompanying back pay. 
Should Begora refuse or decline to take the next scheduled and 
available examination, the reinstatement and back pay order shall 
terminate on the date of the declination or refusal. If he 
should fail to obtain the necessary license after having taken 
that examination, then on the date the results of that 
examination are announced, the reinstatement and back pay order 
shall terminate. The Village is also ordered to process Begora's 
grievance regarding payment for the costs and expenses associated 
with the licensing examination in accordance with the parties' 
contract and practice. The order framed below is intended to 
incorporate these terms and is to be interpreted and applied in 
accordance therewith. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision finding 
the Village in violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act is 
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affirmed and the Village's exceptions in that respect are denied. 
The ALJ's remedial order is modified and the Village's exceptions 
in that respect, to the extent consistent with our decision and 
order, are granted. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village: 
1. Forthwith offer Begora reinstatement to his former 
position if, on the date of this order, he has obtained 
the certificate(s) currently necessary for a Sewage 
Treatment Plant Operator (3C) or he obtains such 
certificate(s) pursuant to the next scheduled and 
available examination. 
2. Make Begora whole for any wages and benefits lost by 
reason of his termination from the date of his 
termination through the date of the offer of 
reinstatement pursuant to paragraph 1 above, less any 
earnings derived as a result of his termination, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. If Begora is not offered reinstatement in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above, then he is to be 
made whole for any wages and benefits lost by reason of 
his termination from the date of his termination 
through either the date Begora declines or refuses to 
take the next scheduled and available examination or 
the results of such examination for acquisition of the 
above-referenced certificate(s) are announced, 
whichever occurs first, less any earnings derived as a 
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result of his termination, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Process the grievance filed by or on behalf of Begora 
in December 1991 concerning payment for the costs and 
expenses incurred or to be incurred in conjunction with 
the examination for the above-referenced 
certificate(s). 
Cease and desist from terminating Begora, should he be 
reinstated, for the filing of grievances dated 
September 23, 1991 and December 16, 1991. 
Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations customarily used to post notices of 
information to unit employees.^ 
DATED: October 19, .1993 
Albany, New York 
luline R. Kinsella,5 Pau sella, Chairperson 
/^v^fc.^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jy^Schmertz, Member 7 
-
7We recognize that circumstances may have changed since the 
record was closed, that there may be issues affecting our order 
of which we have not been apprised, and that the scheduling and 
conduct of the necessary examination may not be within the 
Village's control. If any part of the remedial order cannot be 
implemented within a reasonable period of time, either party may 
move the Board for reconsideration or modification of the 
remedial order. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that 
the Village of Green port will: 
1. Forthwith offer Begora reinstatement to his former position if, on the date of this order, he has obtained the 
certificate(s) currently necessary for a Sewage Treatment Plant Operator (3C) or he obtains such certificate(s) 
pursuant to the next scheduled and available examination. 
; 2. Make Begora whole for any wages and benefits lost by reason of his termination from the date of his 
termination through the date of the offer of reinstatement pursuant to paragraph 1 above, less any earnings 
derived as a result of his termination, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. If Begora 
is not offered reinstatement in accordance with paragraph 1 above, then he is to be made whole for any 
wages and benefits lost by reason of his termination from the date of his termination through either the date 
Begora declines or refuses to take the next scheduled and available examination or the results of such 
examination for acquisition of the above-referenced certificate(s) are announced, whichever occurs first, less 
any earnings derived as a result of his termination, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Process the grievance filed by or on behalf of Begora in December 1991 concerning payment for the costs 
and expenses incurred or to be incurred in conjunction with the examination for the above-referenced 
certificate(s). 
4. Not terminate Begora, should he be reinstated, for the filing of grievances dated September 23, 1991 and 
December 16, 1991. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
VILLAGE OF GREENPORT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 2110, UNITED AUTO WORKERS, NEW 
YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4043 
STATE OF NEW YORK MORTGAGE AGENCY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
) above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 2110, United Auto Workers, 
New York State Housing Finance Agency Employees Association, has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All employees. 
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Excluded: All seasonal employees, and the following titles: 
president; vice-president; AVP personnel, SVP/CFO, 
first deputy controller; SVP/counsel - MIF; SVP-
MIF; V.P.- SFH; director - intergovernmental 
relations; director - marketing; deputy counsel -
MIF; V. P.- research & program development; deputy 
director - MIF; director - operations & program 
development MIF; V.P. - portfolio management; V.P. 
- debt issuance;_V.P.__- deputy CFO;V.P—= 
treasurer; V.P. - comptroller; SVP-COO; deputy 
personnel director; AVP - budget director; V.P. 
intergovernmental relations & external 
communications; V.P. - management information 
systems; V.P. - facilities and administration; SVP 
- general counsel; deputy counsel; associate 
counsel; SVP - housing; director of equal 
opportunity programs; director of public affairs; 
director of intergovernmental relations.-' 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 2110, United Auto 
Workers, New York State Housing Finance Agency Employees 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
^The positions of v.p. portfolio management, v.p. treasurer, 
v.p. management information systems, and v.p. - facilities & 
administration, pursuant to the parties consent agreement, are 
part of the bargaining unit while the present incumbents remain 
in those positions. 
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agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric /f. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- I CASE NO. C-4125 
TOWN OF GRAND ISLAND, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit; Included: All regular full-time and regular part—time, 
hourly paid recreation department employees. 
Excluded: Office clerical, professional, seasonal, 
supervisory and all other employees of the Town 
of Grand Island. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages_, hpu^ 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE ADJUNCT 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-^and- CASE NO. 0-4136 
ROCKLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND COUNTY 
OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Rockland Community College 
Adjunct Faculty Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Adjunct Faculty Employees. 
Excluded: All other employees including elected Rockland 
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County Officials, other employees already 
members of another Rockland County bargaining 
unit, and Rockland Community College 
managerial/confidential employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Rockland Community College 
_Adjunct__Faculty_As_SAciatipn^  
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: October 19, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fc-P.L.-ttn<A 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric: J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
80 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK 12205-2604 
M E M-O.-R A-N.-D...U M 
i October 14, 1993 
TO: John Crotty y 'XiVA »^>'V\ 
FROM: David Quinn^^^* 
RE: Revised Rules of Procedure 
Revisions to the Rules of Procedure were first proposed in 
February 1993. A Notice of Proposed Rule Making was published in 
the State Register in April. At its June 29, 1993 meeting, the 
Board made revisions to one of the proposed rules concerning 
withdrawals of improper practice charges. Because all of the 
proposed rules were submitted as a package, the revision to the 
one rule required publication of a Notice of Revised Rule Making 
concerning all of the rules. Moreover, due to concerns raised by 
the Office of Regulatory and Management Affairs, additional 
changes were made to the rules concerning the filing of pleadings 
other than exceptions, cross-exceptions and responses thereto. 
With these changes, on September 8, 1993, the State Register 
published the package of revised rules. The 30-day comment-
period has elapsed, and the rules are, again, ready for formal 
adoption by the Board at its October 19 meeting. Upon formal 
adoption by the Board, a Notice of Adoption will be published in 
the State Register. The rules will become effective upon 
publication of the Notice of Adoption. 
DQ:cw 
^ ^ printed on recycled paper 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
1. Amend Section 2 00.10 as follows: 
200.10 Filing; service. (a) The term filing, as used in this 
Chapter, shall mean delivery to the board or an agent thereof, or the act 
of mailing to the board[.], or deposit of the papers enclosed in a properly 
• •
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«J addressed wrapper into the custody of an overnight delivery service for 
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_^_ overnight delivery, prior to the latest time designated by the overnight 
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, delivery service for overnight del ivery. 
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"* (b) The term service, as used in this Chapter, shall mean delivery to 
a party or the act of mailing to a party[.], or deposit of the papers 
5- enclosed in a properly addressed wrapper into the custody of an overnight 
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*& delivery service for overnight delivery, prior to the latest time 
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""*-* A. (c) Overnight delivery service means any delivery service which 
\ regularly accepts items for overnight delivery to any address in the state. 
2. Subdivision (4) of Section 201.5(a) is repealed and subdivisions 
g (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) and (11) are renumbered to subdivisions (4) (5) 
\ (6) (7) (8) (9) and (10). 
2> 3. Subdivision (3) of Section 201.5(b) is repealed and subdivisions 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) and (10) are renumbered to (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
and (9) . 
4. Amend Section 201.12(c) as follows: 
(c) Within seven working days after receipt of exceptions, any party 
may file with the board an original and four copies of a response thereto, 
or cross-exceptions and a brief in support thereof, together with proof of 
service of a copy thereof upon each party to the proceeding. Within seven 
working days after receipt of cross-exceptions, any party may file an 
original and four copies of a response thereto, together with proof of 
service of a copy thereof upon each party to the proceeding. No pleading 
other than exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response thereto will be 
accepted or considered by the board unless it is requested by the board or 
filed with the board's authorization. Such additional pleadings will not 
be requested or authorized by the board unless the preceding pleading 
properly raises issues which are material to the disposition of the matter 
for the first time. If any additional pleading is requested or authorized 
by the board, the board shall notify the parties regarding the conditions 
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under which that pleading will be permitted. 
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5. Amend Subsection (4) of Section 204.1(b) as follows: 
(4) if the charge alleges a violation of section 209-a.l(d) or section 
209-a.2(b) of the act, whether the charging party has notified the board in 
writing of the existence of an impasse pursuant to section [205.2] 205.1 of 
this Chapter; and 
6. Amend Section 204.1(d) as follows: 
(d) Amendment and withdrawals. The director or administrative law 
judge designated by the director may permit a charging party to amend the 
charge before, during or after the conclusion of the hearing upon such 
terms as may be deemed just and consistent with due process. The charge 
may be withdrawn by the charging party before the issuance of [a final] the 
dispositive decision and recommended order based thereon upon approval by 
the director. Thereafter, the improper practice proceeding may be 
discontinued only with the approval of the board. Requests to the director 
to withdraw an improper practice charge or to the board to discontinue an 
improper practice proceeding will be approved unless to do so would be 
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Act or due process of 
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law. Whenever the director approves the withdrawal of a charge, or the 
board approves the discontinuation of a proceeding, the case will be 
closed[.] without consideration or review of any of the issues raised by 
the charge. 
7. Amend caption and text of Section 204.11 as follows: 
Section 2 0_4_._11 Cross exceptions [.]; responses; replies. Within 
seven working days after receipt of exceptions, any party may file an 
original and four copies of a response thereto, or cross-exceptions and a 
brief in support thereof, together with proof of service of copies of these 
documents upon each party to the proceeding. Within seven working days 
after receipt of cross-exceptions, any party may file an original and four 
copies of a response thereto, together with proof of service of a copy 
thereof upon each party to the proceeding. No pleading other than 
exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response thereto will be accepted or 
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considered by the board unless it is requested by the board or filed with 
the board's authorization. Such additional pleadings will not be requested 
or authorized by the board unless the preceding pleading properly raises 
issues which are material to the disposition of the matter for the first 
time. If any additional pleading is requested or authorized by the board, 
the board shall notify the parties regarding the conditions under which 
that pleading will be permitted. 
8. Subsection (9) of Section 207.4(b) is amended as follows: 
(9) the following language, quoted verbatim: 
"THE UNDERSIGNED, A PARTY TO A WRITTEN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR 
ARBITRATION AS DESCRIBED HEREWITH, HEREBY DEMANDS ARBITRATION. YOU ARE 
HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT COPIES OF THIS DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION ARE BEING FILED 
WITH THE DIRECTOR OF CONCILIATION, NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD, [50] 8 0 WOLF ROAD, ALBANY, NEW YORK 12 2 05 WITH THE REQUEST 
THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION RULES OF PROCEDURE BE 
COMMENCED. 
PURSUANT TO THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION LAW, ARTICLE 75, SECTION 7503, 
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES, YOU HAVE TWENTY (20) DAYS FROM DATE OF 
SERVICE OF THIS DEMAND TO APPLY TO STAY THE ARBITRATION OR BE PRECLUDED 
FROM SUCH APPLICATION." 
9. Amend Subsections (b) (c) and (d) of Section 208.2 as follows: 
(b) A request to inspect any record shall be made either orally or in 
writing to the board's executive director at [50] 80 Wolf Road, Albany, NY 
12 2 05, who will make suitable arrangements for such inspection during 
regular office hours at the offices of the board in Albany, New York City 
or Buffalo, unless the location of a particular record may require its 
inspection at a particular office, in which case inspection shall occur at 
such office. 
(c) Copies of documents previously prepared for distribution and in 
stock are available [without charge] by either writing to the board's 
executive director or requesting such documents at the board's principal 
offices at [50] 80 Wolf Road, Albany, NY 12205. 
(d) [Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this section, a] A fee 
of 25 cents per page will be charged for all copies made upon request by 
anyone other than a representative of a public employer or employee 
organization or a member of a board panel, to whom one copy of a document 
may be given without charge. The board will make ever^7 effort to comolv 
with requests for such copies as expeditiously as possible. 
10. Amend subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 209.2 as follows: 
(a) Privacy compliance officer means the board's executive director, 
whose business address is Public Employment Relations Board, [50] 80 Wolf 
Rd., Fifth Floor, Albany, NY 12205. 
(b) Privacy compliance appeals officer means the chairperson of the 
board, whose business address is Public Employment Relations Board, [50] 80 
Wolf Road, Fifth Floor, Albany, NY 12205. 
